A provocative article appeared over the break in the NY Times by Charles Griswold entitled “On Forgiveness”. It’s a wide-ranging if not entirely sympathetic (read: par-for-the-course and predictably/instinctively Pelagian) discussion of our favorite subject, raising some interesting questions, the bits about conditionality in particular. Griswold certainly succeeds, however, in painting the like-it-or-not explicitly Christian notions of “preemptive” Romans 5-style forgiveness in even more radical colors. The notion that the “conditions” for genuine forgiveness could be met by another – a substitute, if you will – seems refreshingly antithetical to the whole outlook on display here. Imperfect forgiveness, indeed! A few excerpts:
If you seethe with vengeful thoughts and anger, or even simmer with them, can you be said to have forgiven fully? I would answer in the negative. That establishes another condition that successful forgiveness must meet. In the contemporary literature on forgiveness, the link between forgiveness and giving up vengefulness is so heavily emphasized that it is very often offered as the reason to forgive: forgive, so that you may live without toxic anger.
However, if giving up revenge and resentment were sufficient to yield forgiveness, then one could forgive simply by forgetting, or through counseling, or by taking the latest version of the nepenthe pill. But none of those really seems to qualify as forgiveness properly speaking, however valuable they may be in their own right as a means of getting over anger. The reason is that forgiveness is neither just a therapeutic technique nor simply self-regarding in its motivation; it is fundamentally a moral relation between self and other.
It is not so much the action that is forgiven, but its author. So forgiveness assumes as its target, so to speak, an agent who knowingly does wrong and is held responsible. The moral anger one feels in this case is a reaction that is answerable to reason; and this would hold too with respect to giving up one’s anger.
One of the several sub-paradigmatic or imperfect forms of forgiveness will consist in what is often called unconditional, or more accurately, unilateral forgiveness — as when one forgives the wrongdoer independently of any steps he or she takes. Some hold that unilateral forgiveness is the model, pointing to the much discussed case of the Amish unilaterally forgiving the murderer of their children. I contend, by contrast, that the ideal is bilateral, one in which both sides take steps. I also hold that whether forgiveness is or is not possible will depend on the circumstances and reasons at play; not just anything is going to count as forgiveness. Establishing the minimal threshold for an exchange to count as “forgiveness” is a matter of some debate, but it must include the giving up of revenge by the victim, and an assumption of responsibility by the offender.
Other familiar cases of imperfect forgiveness present their own challenges, as when one seeks to forgive a wrong done to someone else (to forgive on behalf of another, or what is commonly called third-party forgiveness, as for example when the victim is deceased). Another case concerns self-forgiveness. The latter is particularly complicated, as one may seek to forgive oneself for wrongs one has done to others; or for a wrong one has done to oneself (say, degrading oneself) by wronging another; or simply for a wrong one has done only to oneself. Self-forgiveness is notoriously apt to lapse into easy self-exculpation; here too, conditions must be set to safeguard the integrity of the notion.
Are any wrongdoers unforgivable? People who have committed heinous acts such as torture or child molestation are often cited as examples. The question is not primarily about the psychological ability of the victim to forswear anger, but whether a wrongdoer can rightly be judged not-to-be-forgiven no matter what offender and victim say or do. I do not see that a persuasive argument for that thesis can be made; there is no such thing as the unconditionally unforgivable. For else we would be faced with the bizarre situation of declaring illegitimate the forgiveness reached by victim and perpetrator after each has taken every step one could possibly wish for. The implication may distress you: Osama bin Laden, for example, is not unconditionally unforgivable for his role in the attacks of 9/11. That being said, given the extent of the injury done by grave wrongs, their author may be rightly unforgiven for an appropriate period even if he or she has taken all reasonable steps. There is no mathematically precise formula for determining when it is appropriate to forgive.
Many people assume that the notion of forgiveness is Christian in origin, at least in the West, and that the contemporary understanding of interpersonal forgiveness has always been the core Christian teaching on the subject… [ed. note: ha!] Religious origins of the notion would not invalidate a secular philosophical approach to the topic, any more than a secular origin of some idea precludes a religious appropriation of it. While religious and secular perspectives on forgiveness are not necessarily consistent with each other, however, they agree in their attempt to address the painful fact of the pervasiveness of moral wrong in human life. They also agree on this: few of us are altogether innocent of the need for forgiveness.
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3 responses to “Conditional Forgiveness and Unconditional Unforgiveness”
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A couple of thoughts, neither profound:
If you seethe with vengeful thoughts and anger, or even simmer with them, can you be said to have forgiven fully?
I’m not sure “fully” is a useful category here. As a moral and a practical matter, forgiveness is surely a decision and not an emotional state. Sometimes all you can do is make a conscious decision to think about something else than the wrong done and the guilt incurred. Only after that decision is made many times does the anger dissipate. There is someone from my past I might remember 100 times without the least anger. The 101st time I again have to decide whether or not to forgive. And by now forgiving comes relatively easy.
Some hold that unilateral forgiveness is the model, pointing to the much discussed case of the Amish unilaterally forgiving the murderer of their children. I contend, by contrast, that the ideal is bilateral
Of course that’s the ideal, but negotiated or mutually agreed upon forgiveness isn't really forgiveness. Each side has to act unilaterally.
The Amish burned that school house down and built another. Does not diminish their gracious disposition but shows that something still lingered.
Forgiveness is like quiting smoking. it may take a life time of tries.
Jesus says IF your brother sins, rebuke him, and IF he repents, forgive him. Luke 17.
Two “if’s”.